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Performance management and measurement— 
concepts for better management control 
 in public hospitals? 
 
A study of the hospital sector in Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the link between performance measures and decision-making 
processes in the Norwegian hospital sector. The research findings are expected to add 
knowledge to the implementation of performance measurements and management systems in 
this context. The implementation of performance-based management systems acts as an 
element of reform that is similar to the New Public Management reform wave affecting the 
hospital sector internationally.  
 
The empirical study is based on surveys at the national level, structured interviews in a large 
university hospital department, and statistics gathered from the accounting system at the 
clinical department level. A major conclusion is that the standard unit cost per patient, which 
is important benchmarking data, does not give relevant information for decisions in the 
hospital. Furthermore, the crudeness in the input and output measures hampers the 
implementation of performance management in health care institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Hospital sector; Performance measurements; Performance management; 
Benchmarking data; Strategic and operational decisions  
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1. Introduction 
 
The worldwide public sector reform processes, often called the New Public Management 
Reforms (NPM), have implied a wide range of changes in many different areas of service. 
One important element in these reforms is the introduction of private sector management 
techniques. In the hospital sector, these techniques are accompanied by performance audit 
schemes and a more explicit demand from the hospital owner (the state) to implement 
evaluation programmes to assess efficiency and effectiveness. The use of accounting 
information is a central part in these reforms. Consequently, performance measures are key 
words in this respect. 
 
Against this background, this paper investigates the use of performance measures in the 
management control and decision-making processes in the Norwegian hospital sector. The 
focus is put on the application of performance measures and the use of economic measures as 
parts of the management control processes. The development of private sector styles of 
management practice, which imply a move towards explicit and formal measurable standards 
and measures of performance, will be the main topic in the discussion. These changes in 
management practices presuppose performance measures and the basing of resources and pay 
on actual performance. Taken together, these changes imply a more specific focus on 
measuring input and performance. Thus, the research issue is whether the performance 
measures give relevant information for decision making.  
 
In this paper, the theoretical framework is first outlined and the empirical study described. 
These sections are followed by a discussion of the findings, with some preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical perspective of the paper is based on both normative and descriptive 
frameworks. In normative literature on management control, the link between plans and 
actions is not questioned. However, within the more descriptive works, concepts such as de-
coupling and ambiguity are used to understand the control tasks in complex organisations 
such as public hospitals. 
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2.1 Hospitals as complex organisations: the role of accounting 
 
Hospitals are complex organisations. In this respect, Meyer and Scott (1992: 101-102) have 
pointed to the strength of medical professionals’ autonomy and the strong professional 
structures and dominance of professionals in hospitals. This situation implies decoupling of 
the core activities—i.e., the performance of the health care professionals from the 
administrative hierarchy in the hospitals. The organisational solutions to these situations have 
been conceptualised by Weick (1976) as loose couplings and were found to exist in an 
empirical study of the link between budgets, accounting information, and decision-making 
processes at strategic and operational levels in a large hospital in Norway (Nyland and 
Pettersen, 2004). 
 
The decoupling of health care delivery processes from the formal, administrative structures 
such as accounting practices may be observed as the decoupling of plans from action. In such 
inconsistent environments that characterise the contexts of hospitals, the budgets may serve 
the function of maintaining legitimacy, as the budget frames are constructed by the politicians 
and disconnected from the actual expenditures and activities of the hospitals (Brunsson, 1989; 
Pettersen, 1995). These observations also apply to the two different rationalities in such 
organisations. The clinical world follows the logic of appropriateness, whereas the 
administrative world’s decisions are based on the logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen, 
1976). Thus, health care delivery is buffered from accounting structures. When accounting 
information does penetrate into the core activities of the hospitals (the health care delivery 
processes), the information may induce unintended action visualised as symbols, rituals, and 
hypocritical behaviour (Brunsson, 1989; Nyland and Pettersen, 2004).  
 
Conventional accounting information with a normative perspective is more in line with the 
aims of traditional production organisation efficiency than with the multiple objectives and 
complexity of loosely coupled organisations such as large hospitals. In these organisations the 
measuring of output and efficiency is more complicated. There are few (if any) value 
measures of the services provided and no profit measurement of public services, mainly 
because the budget allocations do not mirror the quality of health care activities.  
 
Several studies have pointed to the ineffectiveness of costing and management accounting 
information in hospitals (Perrin, 1988; Preston et al., 1992; Lapsley, 1996; Jones and Dewing, 
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1997). In particular, the focus has been on the inability of the accounting systems to match  
the relevant information needs of key decision makers in hospital resource allocations 
(Lapsley, 1996; Jones and Dewing, 1997). Therefore, there is a demand for accounting 
information to contribute to making hospital organisations transparent and easily accessible 
for external evaluation. 
 
Consequently, the concept of accounting has become more visible in the hospitals. This trend 
has been called accountingization. According to Hood (1995:93), “accountingization means 
the introduction of ever more explicit cost categorization into areas where costs were 
previously aggregated, pooled or undefined”. Kurunmäki et al. (2003) use this concept as 
described by Power and Laughlin (1992:132-133) to illustrate the influence of financial 
measures and how they impinge on core values in organisations. This instrumental 
perspective on accounting is an alternative to the concept of legitimation based on a more 
social constructivist perspective. The instrumental perspective has been developed as it was 
observed that in loosely-coupled organisations, accounting rules and other formal procedures 
may be of less importance instrumentally than in private sector production organisations 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Lapsley, 1994). 
 
However, the role of management accounting in hospitals can play both a legitimating role 
and an instrumental role. In their study of the use of accounting information in intensive care 
units in Finland and the UK, Kurunmäki et al. (2003) found that management accounting was 
absorbed by health care professionals in the Finnish setting, while in the UK the accounting 
expertise was deployed as a defensive shield by health care professionals:  
The differing social and institutional contexts of management accounting practice 
shape its role as accountingization (“clinician-management-accountants”) or 
legitimating (“the accountant as historian”) (2003:136). 
 
The emergence of management accounting practices as accountingization shifts the emphasis 
from input and process accountability elements to accountability in terms of results. 
Accounting then becomes a central part in a new conception of accountability, with high trust 
in market transactions and private sector business methods, low trust in public sector 
administrative traditions, and a strong belief in the concept of economic rationality. The 
consequences of this shift in the conception of accountability in public sector management 
can be summarised as follows:  
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• The shift in emphasis from hierarchies to more competitive bases for providing public 
resources to hospitals 
• The move away from fixed to variable pay  
• The change from uniform public services to an emphasis on contract provisions 
 
All of these trends have created an increased trust in accounting information as a set of tools 
for decision making. 
  
2.2 Management accounting and benchmarking   
 
Along with the move to the new concept of accountability, there has also been a search for 
mechanisms to develop more transparency in public services. This process has been central to 
the introduction of benchmarking initiatives. In the public sector, the idea of benchmarking is 
that this systematic gathering of quantitative data may give evidence of efficiency and of 
quality in the delivered services. In the UK, the series of financial management reforms in 
hospitals has motivated the reporting of NHS cost information with the intention of 
introducing external cost control: 
 The new performance framework will encourage greater benchmarking of 
performance in different areas, and  the publication of comparative information will 
allow people to compare performance and share best practice... (Department of Health, 
UK, 1998:6).  
 
The intention of this benchmarking initiative was to supply purchasers of health care services 
and NHS executives with tools “to tackle inefficiency and differential performance” 
(Northcott and Llewellyn, 2003) in order to put pressure on “inefficient” hospital trusts to 
reduce costs. As  Northcott and Llewellyn stated, the benchmarking themes of measurement 
against a referent hospital, the opportunity of information sharing and, hence, continuous 
improvement were all present in the government rhetoric when the increased work on national 
benchmarking data in the UK was introduced.  
 
However, some serious problems were associated with the fulfilment of the benchmarking 
ideas. First, were the problems in identifying where the benchmarking standards lay, because 
of failures to identify a standard of excellence or acceptable cost efficiency. Second, there 
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were large differences in the costing practices in hospitals that made the construction of cost 
indexes dependent on data with low robustness and thus created wrong specifications: 
All of these difficulties negate the achievement of the central motives of 
benchmarking: continuous improvement, measurement against a referent other and 
rigour (Northcott and Llewellyn, 2003:63).  
 
2.3 From indexes to cost drivers  
 
Criticisms of the use of cost indexes and other financial measures have been raised also in the 
accounting literature, where it has been stated that the traditional management accounting 
systems have lost their relevance:  
Today’s management accounting information, driven by the procedures and cycle of 
organisation’s financial reporting system, is too late, too aggregated and too distorted 
to be relevant for managers’ planning and control decisions (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987:1).  
 
In this context, there is a need for a study of cost indexes as performance measures in the 
hospital sector, to counter the lack of knowledge of the factors that drive costs behind the 
unit-cost indexes. The focus on cost causality is crucial, because the traditional costing 
systems fail to reveal the structures of the cost drivers (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988). This cost-
driver perspective is of vital importance when cost indexes and other measures are analysed 
on hospital levels. The cost level of a hospital can be divided into costs related to various 
functions, specialities, or departments. Furthermore, costs depend on resource consumption 
arising from the severity of illness of the patients and the intensity of treatment, number of 
patient admissions, and number of examinations, tests and procedures undertaken in the 
treatment of patients.  
 
All these stated cost elements should in principle be explicitly available in the information 
system if cost index information is to guide decisions and actions. The question is whether 
such information is available in the hospitals’ management systems.  
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2.4 Interactive control mechanisms 
 
Literature on strategic cost management focuses on different management control 
perspectives, where the diagnostic and the interactive perspectives are most relevant. In the 
diagnostic perspective, the focus is on the alternatives to control or programming of processes 
(Simons, 1995). From this perspective, budget and accounting information should be followed 
by performance evaluation schemes  and Balanced Scorecards—systems that often are 
characterised as the main chain in the control system:  
Diagnostic control systems are the formal information systems that managers use to 
monitor organisational outcomes and correct deviations from present standards of 
performance (Simons, 1995: 95). 
 
Such systems are designed for motivation, control, and evaluation. The quality of such 
systems is dependent on the ability to tie performance (output) to the processes of service 
production, the availability of evaluation standards/indexes, and the possibility of active 
intervention when deviations are observed. In this context, the establishing of performance 
measures is important. As mentioned earlier, neither the cost indexes nor the creation of 
patient diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) are meeting these measurement criteria. 
 
From the interactive control perspective, dialogue-based activity is the mechanism that ties 
together the formal and the informal elements in the control systems. We may believe that in 
contexts such as hospitals with a high degree of complexity, ambiguity, and change, dialogue 
and face-to-face communications will be vital as rich information media (Daft and Lengel, 
1986). However, the dialogues should be based on relevant information:  
Interactive control systems are formal information systems managers use to involve 
themselves regularly and personally in the decision activities of subordinates (Simons, 
1996: 95).  
 
The interactive control perspective focuses not on output as such, but on monitoring the 
organisational processes for the implications of decisions as the main consideration (rather 
than the data). Consequently, the discursive frame of the interactive perspective facilitates the 
decision processes at strategic levels, which presuppose active participation from managers at 
all levels. The management control system in Norwegian hospitals has focused on cost 
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measurement rather than cost management (Nyland, 2003). In the next part of the paper, we 
will discuss some major empirical characteristics of that management control system. 
 
3. The empirical study 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Almost all hospitals in Norway are owned by the state, and the Norwegian hospital sector  
since 2002 has been divided into five large administrative regions. There are some 250 
different health care institutions, from large hospitals to small outpatient units, which are 
organised into 40 local hospital enterprises. These enterprises are defined as autonomous 
administrative entities as to internal management systems and strategies. One of the main 
objects behind this reform was to make the hospital enterprises more accountable for their 
economic performance. Since 1997, Norwegian hospitals have been paid on a combined 
per-case payment and fixed-frames basis, where 60% of the total expenditure is based on 
budget frames. The revised payment system and the hospital enterprise reform are in line with 
the New Public Management reform concepts, as described previously.   
 
The Norwegian hospital enterprise reform created new demands for management system 
structures, and the Norwegian Parliament decided that all hospital departments had to 
implement unitary management from 2002. The introduction of unitary management can be 
understood as implementation of one cornerstone idea of the New Public Management 
reforms, namely the realization of the performance management idea as a basis for governing 
public services. In order to establish performance management, managers must be given full 
accountability and autonomy to find ways to achieve objectives. In other words, the hospital 
department should be evaluated against its ability to reach a set of clear performance criteria 
and performance targets. This process is often referred to as devolution or decentralisation. 
Consequently, the tendency is to evaluate performance rather than relying on evaluation 
systems based on professional norms, rules, and specification of procedures.  
 
Furthermore, a new law on patients’ rights accompanied the hospital enterprise reform. This 
law implies that patients are given stronger legal rights, which—more or less—contribute to 
the patients being considered as customers. 
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Taken together, the different reforms mentioned here aim to establish organisational 
autonomy, to achieve transparency and professional management. As reforms, they move the 
public hospitals away from traditional public administrative systems of governance to more 
transparent and managed systems with an emphasis on the role of performance management. 
Seen a mere two years after the introduction of the hospital enterprise reform, transparency 
may be observed as the introduction of more detailed instruments to monitor performance and 
quality, accompanied by the patients’ rights to be informed. The department managers are 
supposed to document better performance and results compared with many indicators on 
economic, medical, and clinical activities and indirect/direct quality measures. 
 
The monitoring of economic performance in Norwegian hospitals is based on a national 
benchmarking database. Every year, the Ministry of Health works out performance indicators 
at all levels, including national data and data on the enterprise levels. However, the question is 
whether these data increase transparency in the hospital sector.  
 
3.2 The organisation of the management control functions in Norwegian hospitals 
 
In order to understand how management control activities were organised in the Norwegian 
hospital sector, a survey study was undertaken among the financial managers in the national 
population of hospitals. Among the 35 responding hospitals, the average number of 
employees in the management control function was counted as one employee per each 300 
person-years in the hospitals. At that time (1999) the strategic and operational management 
control functions were centralised to the staff at the general manager’s office.  
 
These key respondents pointed to large deficiencies in the management control systems. The 
cost structure was perceived as complex, and every one of the 35 respondents said that it was 
impossible to calculate the cost of activities or cost-per-patient groups. This was contradictory 
to the fact that almost all the directors (84%) claimed this information to be very important for 
high quality control. Furthermore, calculation for decision making seldom took place, and the 
focus in the budget evaluation process was heavily on the cost side, whereas the income side 
was underestimated. In other words, the focus was on record keeping without attention on 
performance evaluation and feedback. Consequently, no action was taken to tie performance 
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measures to activity information, and thus accounting information was not used to guide 
decision making.   
 
The financial managers in our study claimed that very few models of management control 
tools such as ABC, Balanced Scorecard, and so on were implemented in the hospital. Reasons 
given included these:  
“Time is a bottle-neck, and we do not have the right competence.” 
“We have too little resources for strategic planning—we have only time for keeping 
the wheels going ….” 
“A general problem for hospitals is the fact that we need managerial generalists to 
keep going. Lack of time is then the problem.” 
 
“To keep the wheels going” meant that the activity was focused on record keeping. Most 
managerial and accounting resources in the hospitals were occupied with cost reporting from 
clinical departments and aggregating these into cost reports at hospital level. This approach 
implied that management control for strategic purposes and planning was absent in the 
hospitals, and the knowledge about the connection between activity and cost was scarce. In an 
interview conducted in February 2004 with a financial director in one of the five regional 
health administrations, the informant concluded that this absence of management control for 
strategic purposes was still the situation after two years with the hospital enterprise reform. 
 
These observations confirm the impression that information on cost is only aggregated and 
not decomposed to activity level or performance groups. This is in accordance with the 
criticisms in accounting literature stemming from the “relevant lost” discussion, and the 
observation that the focus on performance measures in general has been absent. 
Accounting textbooks and the academic literature in accounting have, however, 
largely ignored the issue of productivity measures (Banker and Datar, 1987).  
 
Aggregated productivity measures exist in Norway on a national benchmarking level. But as 
can be seen from the foregoing comments of financial managers in the survey study, they are 
not used for internal strategic purposes. In Norway, the national benchmarking data have been 
produced every year for the last 15–20 years. These performance indicators include measures 
on productivity, cost indexes, number of in-patients treated per hospital (and per hospital 
departments and specialities). The numbers of outpatient consultations are also presented. The 
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measures are presented at national and regional levels; however, their quality has been 
questioned. Criticism has been levelled at the aggregation problems, the failure to  decompose 
the indicators into relevant units, and the complexity of tasks, which is not accounted for in 
the measures (Nyland and Bjørnenak, 2002).  
 
Performance measurement indicators are based on the cost index, which shows the cost level 
relative to the average, corrected according to patient composition (diagnoses). The critical 
question is whether these indexes give relevant information. The study referred to earlier  
indicates that these indexes showing the relation between activity and cost are not used for 
strategic purposes in hospitals. If indexes are used for any information purposes, the focus is 
on cost per in-patient treatment —DRG-adjusted, i.e., according to patient diagnosis-related  
group (Fetter and Freeman, 1986), cost per in-patient day, number of patients per person (or 
doctor)-year and other efficiency rates. As can be seen from this short overview, the data 
information is very aggregated and standardised.  
 
 
3.3 The case study 
 
We have discussed several criticisms of the benchmarking data and performance measures 
within this field. The focus has especially been on the application of unit cost as a means of 
analysing the cost drivers behind rising costs in hospitals. A case study was conducted in 
2001/2002 based on information from doctors on resource consumption. The study was 
undertaken in the surgical department of a large university hospital in Norway. The research 
question was whether high unit costs indicated unsuccessful management control in hospitals. 
 
To understand and analyse the actual operation of management control systems, it is 
necessary to go beyond the descriptive accounts and to study how key decision makers 
understand and act under the system in practice. Consequently, it was decided to conduct a 
case study to go further into a complex system in practice (Yin, 1994). The research model 
was based on qualitative data, implying that our empirical information depended on the 
responses from members of the organisation. These members were key decision makers and 
their attitudes and knowledge gave input to a deeper understanding of the empirical setting. 
The answers and information of these key informants are vital data when studying managerial 
processes. By conducting interviews with key actors in the control processes, we were able to 
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understand and identify systems in practice. The data collection was based on semi-structured 
interviews. The interview guide was pre-tested before the final data collection. In order to 
obtain valid information, each construct was explained and discussed with the respondents 
during the interviews. The interviews were transcribed, and a summary of the transcriptions 
was sent to each respondent for comments and corrections.  
 
 Secondary data such as budget documents, activity data and data on patient records 
(anonymous) were used as supplementary information in order to gather relevant contextual 
knowledge about the hospital. However, the key informants provided most of the information 
used in this study. While this may have introduced elements of bias to the study, the inclusion 
of key informants as data sources is well recognised in the qualitative research literature 
(Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
 
The case study was introduced by presenting the doctors with the figures showing the 
development in the overall unit cost in the surgical department. After this introductory 
meeting, the chief clinician participated in selecting a representative number of informants to 
be included in the case study. Thirteen doctors agreed to be included, and they were each 
interviewed for an average length of approximately 90 minutes. The interviews were 
conducted in the doctors’ offices. An interview guide was prepared beforehand and presented 
to the doctors during the interview. The questions were developed to discuss different kinds of 
complexity in the cost-driver perspective in order to analyse the following: 
• Factors which could be associated with driving the resources used, dependent on 
the number of patients and the medical needs of individual patients 
• Factors which could be associated with driving the resources used, and which were 
not dependent on the number of patients and the situations of individual patients    
 
The surgical department in the University Hospital is one of the largest in Norway. In the 
department there are approximately 50 physicians and 7300 in-patients during a year. 
The managerial problem was—among others—defined as an increase in number of doctors 
without the same relative increase in activity. This department had experienced the same 
challenges as other hospitals in Norway, as the number of doctors employed in hospitals, had 
been rising in Norway during the last 5–10 years. The hospital activity and the number of 
patients treated had also increased, but at a lower rate than the increase in number of doctors. 
During the same time period, the unit cost had also increased, which is to say that the 
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efficiency also was reduced—substantially. However, the cost-driver perspective was 
completely absent in the discussions on this reduction of efficiency. This is contrary to the 
cost-driver perspective being a central concept in the strategic management control literature 
(Porter, 1985:63).  
 
When analysing the available activity documents and reports in the department, it was 
observed that the services and outcomes in the surgical department were difficult to define; 
consequently, the resources consumed with each unit of outcome also were difficult to 
measure. Therefore, some indirect measures had to be defined. The most widely applied 
efficiency measure is the DRG-adjusted in-patient treatments, which implies that in-patient 
treatments are defined as outcomes. The constituent parts of the patient-related activities 
which comprise out-patient and day-patients are restructured into DRG-points which are 
meant to include all patient activities (Fetter and Freeman, 1986). These indicators were 
available as information in the surgical department.  
 
The input measure used in this department is the number of doctor-years. This measure is 
very crude, because it is impossible to match with the mix of services and activities that are 
made. The measure is calculated as number of doctors employed multiplied by the number of 
planned working hours a year—not the number of actual hours worked. It does not include 
overtime, which is an element believed to be substantial in the actual number of hours 
performed. Furthermore, it was observed that the doctors’ activities in the department were 
very interrelated with the activities of other professional groups (mainly nurses) and 
interrelated with the use of medical-technical equipment and innovations. Consequently, the 
measuring of doctor-years as proxy input measures do not include all the relevant and 
interrelated activities. Despite all the crudeness inherent in the outcome-measures and activity 
measures discussed in this paper, they are widely used as indicators of development in unit 
costs.  
------------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Fig. 1. Unit cost defined as wage expenditures per DRG-point, 1993–20002 
                                                 
2 When the DRG-indexes are calculated, it is important that the same reference model for the calculations is 
used. Changes in the treatment practices and technological innovations may be expected to affect the efficiency 
measures. However, these changes are supposed not to be included here.  
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Figure 1 shows that there is a heavy increase in the unit cost by 44% in the period 1995–98. 
During this period, wages increased substantially, and a large part of these increases in unit 
cost was caused by this price-effect. These increases in unit costs are externally imposed, and 
they should in principle be extracted from the evaluation of the development of the 
department efficiency. However, unit costs may also be affected by internal department 
decisions such as the mix in use of doctor resources in the department. One method to isolate 
the effect of changes in unit cost is to use number of doctor-years as a measure of resources.  
 
----------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Number of doctor-years per 1000 DRG points, 1992–20003 
 
From Figure 2 we can observe that the unit cost increased by 24% from 1992 to 1997, and the 
increase during the whole period was 14%. In this way, we can illustrate the use of doctor 
resources combined with volume/activity. However, the effects of non-volume factors are still 
present in the unit cost. The information in Figure 1 is still a mixture of different effects made 
by volume, productivity, and measurement biases due to the conceptual problems inherent in 
the definition of activity numbers and resource consumption.  
 
Another proxy measure of productivity is the number of DRG-points per employed doctor per 
year. According to the hospital manager, this is a performance measure used in the 
management control of the hospital. Figure 3 shows the number of DRG-points per doctor and 
the number of doctors employed in the department during the period 1992–2000. 
                                                 
3 Changes in number of hours per doctor-year due to changes in the contracts between the employer and the 
employees, extra hours worked, and so on are not included. This makes the numbers somewhat more misleading. 
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-------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
Fig. 3 Number of DRG-points per employed doctor and number of doctors in the department, 
1992–2000 
 
In general, most of the key informants pointed to the fact that these performance measures 
(DRG-points) were highly ambiguous and not “real” measures. When the hospital payment 
system was changed in 1997 from basically fixed-frame budgets to prospective per-case 
payment based on DRG-unit prices, the key informants interviewed said that this change 
increased the focus on the coding of diagnoses and procedures, which in turn produced a 
strategic increase in the number of DRG-points. These informants with close interaction with 
the world of clinical reality interpreted the increase in DRG-points per employed doctor in the 
department from 1997 as a strategic adaptation and not a real increase in activity. 
 
Other important trends (which the output measure does not account for) are the observations 
that the population of patients is growing older and therefore more demanding of resources:  
 We have got very old patients and the tendency is towards ever older and more 
demanding (due to severity of illness) patients. These patients stay longer in the 
hospitals and consequently, the capacity for other patients’ decreases. The illnesses 
are getting more complex, with problems from heart, lungs and circulation deceases. 
This implies that we must cooperate and coordinate with other specialities … 
(Surgeon in the department).  
 
As can be observed from this statement, more complex diseases are now registered with more 
frequent comorbidity among patients. Complexity of diseases increases with age,  as older 
patients have more comorbidity diseases in heart, lung, and other organ systems.  
 
The presence of more demanding patients is partly caused by the great technological 
innovations made in surgical specialities during the last 10 years. This is especially true for 
the use of laparoscopic surgery and invasive techniques:   
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We are now treating patients who earlier did not get any treatment such as patients 
with cancer spreading to the liver …. This reduces the capacity to treat patients with 
less complex diagnoses.  
 
As the degree of specialisation increases, both the patients and the doctors will work 
towards higher levels of competence and complexity…. (Surgeon in the department). 
 
Technological development causes changes in efficiency in different ways. Sometimes, these 
changes will imply less resource-demanding procedures (e.g., laparoscopic surgery). 
However, this is in fact very seldom the case:  
Technically complex procedures need more doctors in order to supply high quality 
services. The procedures are technically more demanding, the learning processes are 
slower and many doctors will – on the average – need training and education. This 
will in turn imply duplication of doctors. Of course, this will cause high quality 
treatments, but not necessarily shorter stays and reduced costs…  (Assistant surgeon 
in the department). 
 
Another tendency is the fact that the most highly specialised hospitals,  due to this 
specialisation, receive patients from other hospitals: 
No doubt that other hospitals transfer the most seriously ill patients to us… and thus, 
they keep the cheaper(and more profitable) patients themselves. As soon as there is 
comprehensive intensive care treatments involved, patients are sent to us…. (Surgeon 
in the department). 
 
This kind of “patient shuffling” has been widely debated as a possible consequence of the 
DRG-based payment system to hospitals (Ellis, 1998).  
 
Costs and efficiency in hospitals are also affected by factors other than technological 
innovation and patients’ diagnoses. Some of these factors are related to cultural and 
traditional practices, such as the tradition that doctors work without payment when they are 
technically off-duty. This is a cultural factor, which has changed during the period, and this 
trend has in fact reduced the number of working hours: 
In my career as doctor here since 1983… I now notice that the assistant doctors 
consequently leave the hospital when they are off-duty in the mornings even when 
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there might be very interesting challenges in the operating theatre. Leisure time is now 
given higher priority than the career … (Chief surgeon in the department). 
 
I do very little work which is not directly paid by the employer… (Assistant surgeon in 
the department). 
 
Over the last 10 years, the department has been split into six different sections, an outcome 
mainly driven by technological development and the demand for highly specialised services. 
The direct cost accompanying this sectioning might not be high, but the indirect costs are 
estimated to be relatively high. Due to on-call services in every section, the number of doctors 
has increased far more than the relative increase in patient volume in these sections: 
The patient volume has been relatively stable here. So, in your way of measuring this, 
we are now more specialists treating the same amount of patients… (Chief surgeon in 
the department).  
 
In order to make the system of working-plans to fit together, we need more doctors –
but they are here less at the day time – due to the continuous work day and night… 
(Assistant surgeon in the department). 
 
In this hospital there are other functions present such as research activities and the education 
and training of doctors. The number of students has increased significantly in recent years. 
Most clinical education is done in close contact with patients in the clinic, and this structural 
contingency can result in that the number of doctors being almost doubled during periods with 
educational activities. Figure 3 shows that the number of doctors increased by 60% over the 
whole period. Since the efficiency measure does not include research and education, increased 
activity within these fields is causing efficiency to decrease. One informant has experienced  
change in this way: 
These days it happens that we can do clinical research work during ordinary working 
days. This was completely impossible in the earlier days… (Surgeon in the 
department). 
 
However, this picture is not quite homogeneous. The increased number of doctors is also 
driving resource consumption through increased complexity: 
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The more people we are here, the more complex is the activity… (Surgeon in the 
department). 
 
There are now so many different hierarchies to cooperate and communicate with…it 
takes too much time… (Surgeon in the department). 
 
Now we have different specialists for every part of the body. This means that the 
patients must be administered through different doctors and specialities, and this is 
very time-consuming. Such quality implies higher costs” (Assistant surgeon in the 
department). 
 
In general, the doctors are less accessible to patients in the daytime, and consequently, several 
different doctors have to get information on the same patient and spend time to understand 
and communicate their information, which in turn also reduces the continuity in the treatment 
chain. As the number of doctors having clinical responsibility for a patient increases, the need 
for documentation and paperwork increases:  
“Reduced throughput of patients is not a problem of resources, but an organisational 
problem. A patient may during his/her stay meet 5-6 different doctors; one at the 
outpatient unit, one who prepares for the operation. Another who performs the 
procedures in the operating theatre, one doctor who takes care of the patient when 
he/she leaves, and finally, the clinical manager of the department very often looks 
through all the patient administrative papers after the patient has left. Thus, a lot of 
resources are consumed which are not directly connected to the treatment itself…” 
(Chief surgeon in the department). 
 
To summarise the foregoing discussion, there are indications that increased unit costs do not 
necessarily imply lower productivity and unsuccessful management control. The reason is to 
be found in the very crude measures of input and output. As a synthesis, we may say that 
increased specialisation, sectioning of departments, and complexity in the production of 
services have increased the tasks of coordination vertically and horizontally in the hospital. 
These structural changes will affect unit costs, and consequently, unit costs will not give a 
true picture of the performance level and management control activities.  
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In order to understand what drives the increase in hospital unit costs, it is necessary to 
decompose the different factors related to patient needs and the services offered by the 
hospital. This implies that there are costs related to the patients’ resource consumption and 
costs related to more function-related resource consumption. The traditional focus on 
aggregated information based on activity volume and number of patients produces low-quality 
information that in turn does not support the clinical and administrative management in their 
strategic and operational decisions.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The introduction of the new management practices in the hospital sector has been discussed 
with the focus on the introduction of private sector management techniques such as 
performance measurement and performance audit schemes. The research question was to 
investigate the application of performance measures in decision making. A national survey 
study and a case study in a surgical department at a large university hospital were undertaken 
in order to study the systems in action.  
 
4.2 Measurement biases 
 
There are obvious weaknesses associated with performance measures in hospitals. These 
apply mainly to the fact that the activities that are not directly included in the treatment of 
patients such as the education and training of professional staff, capacity invested in on-call 
services, and research activities, are not included in the performance concept. In a surgical 
department there are many different performance measures like surgical procedures, number 
of patient treatments, research activities, education activities, and on-call services related to 
emergency situations. The choice of the number of DRG-adjusted treatments as a 
performance measure indicates that most of the other measures mentioned are not included in 
the statistics.  
 
The main reason for these measurement problems is that surgical services—as with most 
health care services—are integrated production processes where resource usage is not 
separable into clearly defined elements. Consequently, the input measure (cost) most often 
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includes total resource usage, while the output measures only account for part of the total 
range of activity. Furthermore, these measurement biases are not constant over time. In 
general, performance measures which are crude, aggregated, and inflicted with mismatched 
information are of very little practical use as performance measures, because they invite 
strategic action in the form of sub-optimalisation, but give little causal information to guide 
actions through interactive control (Simons, 1995). 
 
4.3 Complexity and the role of accounting information 
 
The financial directors in the nationwide survey study confirmed without exception that there 
were large deficiencies in the hospitals’ management control systems. The focus has been— 
and still is—on cost reporting and cost control. Consequently the use of accounting 
information in strategic planning is absent. Although this information was gathered before the 
large hospital enterprise reform in Norway in 2002, key respondents admitted that this was 
also the situation after the reform. 
 
Furthermore, there is little knowledge on the connection between activities in the hospital and 
the cost drivers, especially as cost information is not decomposed into relevant cost drivers. 
There are also obvious weaknesses attached to the national benchmarking data that are based 
on cost, including unit costs associated with the diagnosis-adjusted in-patient treatments 
(DRGs). First, there are the technical problems inherent in the make-up of the statistics on 
patients and patient groups. Second, the cost indexes and unit-cost concept are too aggregated 
to give relevant information for diagnostic management action and interactive management 
control processes (Simons, 1995). 
 
The case study in the surgical department illustrated the managerial problems associated with 
the measuring of input and output in order to analyse why expenditures were rising 
substantially during several years. The study illustrated the process of decomposing 
information in order to understand why unit costs, defined as wage expenditures per DRG-
point for 1993–2000 were rising. The study showed that the costing had to consider the 
number of doctor-years per 1000 DRG-points for 1992–2000, the number of DRG-points per 
employed doctor, and number of doctors in the department for 1992–2000 in order to develop 
indicators that had relevance for decision making. The documentation revealed that 
measurement errors in unit costs existed because input measures included total resource 
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consumption, while output measures only comprised the number of patients treated. This is to 
say that the information was not decomposed into relevant elements, and the measures did not 
add transparency to the organisation. 
 
4.4 The lack of diagnostic and interactive control 
 
Another main finding was that the cost per patient treated in the hospital did not provide an 
adequate performance measure that could give relevant information for strategic decisions. 
Although the clinical managers in the surgical department in the large hospital over a long 
period had observed rising unit costs, no diagnostic actions were taken. The discussions were 
mainly focused on reasons and excuses for the rising costs, and very few questions were 
raised as to developing alternative strategies.  
 
This lack of diagnostic action may be due to the measurement problems, as the existing 
performance measures did not give transparency upon which control action could be based. 
When information is too aggregated and includes too much irrelevant information or is 
missing relevant information, interactive control procedures also will be hampered. 
Consequently, the motives behind the introduction of performance measures—learning and 
improvement through monitoring—are more rhetorical and symbolic than observable in 
practice.  
 
4.5 Implications and future research 
 
This research has been based on three sources of data that gave insight into the fact that 
accounting information was mostly used for recording and historical purposes, and that there 
was very little diagnostic action based on this information. Furthermore, large measurement 
biases were found in the performance measures. The widely used performance measure 
defined as unit cost per patient treated was very crude due to measurement problems both in 
the input and the output measures. Consequently, these measures did not facilitate strategic 
and operational decisions. This effect in turn implied that transparency was not added to the 
hospitals’ resource utilisation or production processes.  
 
This lack of transparency is illustrated in the fact that there had been increasing unit costs per 
treated patient in the hospital department for many years, but no diagnostic actions were 
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observed. One reason might be that it was difficult to analyse from the data why unit costs 
were rising, whether this was due to technological changes, changes in the mix of production, 
or changes in efficiency rates. In fact, the data on unit cost created frustration, confusion, and 
did not act as incentives for learning or improvement.  
 
It should be noted that these data give a picture of the situation in a surgical department as a 
particular context, and the findings can therefore only to a limited extent be generalised. If the 
study were to be repeated in departments with other medical specialities, new insight might be 
given as to the adjustments hospitals make in times of changing management control systems.  
 
However, the analyses add to our knowledge on how performance measures are used in 
hospital settings. Future research will benefit from going deeper into the questions on the 
cost-driver perspectives and the complexity of health care services that should be understood 
in order to develop practical indicators for interactive control purposes.  
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Fig. 1. Unit cost defined as wage expenditures per DRG-point, 1993-20004 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 When the DRG-indexes are calculated, it is important that the same reference model for the calculations is 
used. Changes in the treatment practices and technological innovations may be expected to affect the efficiency 
measures. However, these changes are supposed not to be included here.  
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Fig. 2.  Number of doctor-years per 1000 DRG points, 1992–20005 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Changes in number of hours per doctor-year due to changes in the contracts between the employer and the 
employees, extra hours worked and so on are not included, which make the numbers somewhat more 
misleading... 
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Fig. 3.  Number of DRG-points per employed doctor (1) and number of doctors in the 
department (2), 1992–2000. 
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